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INTRODUCTION 
To-day the world is divided into two armed camps. The 
United States and the Soviet Union are the two leaders 
of these divergent groups . Yet only fifteen years ago 
these two nations were allied against the Axis powers . 
An obvious question is what caused this wartime alliance 
to degenerate into the present conf'lict. The factors which 
led to this occurance are numerous. Therefore, it would 
be impossible to take any individual, nation, or event 
and say the responsibility is theirs. However, when 
charges and counter-charges are being made, the name 
"Yalta" appears freq_uently. Some extremests will tell 
you that the majority of to-days problems, concerning the 
Soviet Union, had their birth at this meeting of Roosevelt, 
Stalin, and Churchill at Yalta in February 1945. It is 
desirable to look closer at this event, and to find out 
just what did occur. The purpose of this paper will be 
to discuss some of the major decisions which were reached 
at Yalta, and to see what factors led to these decisions. 
Also an appraisal will be made of the diplomacy of Pres-
ident Roosevelt during this conference. This will be 
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accomplished by discussing the major criticisms and 
justifications of the decisions he made , and the method 
by which the decisions were reached. 
The Crimean Conference held at Yalta in the Soviet 
Union will go down in history as one of the most important 
events of all time. Here in eight days President Frank-
lin Roosevelt of the United States, Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill of Great Britain, and Premier Josef Stalin of 
the Soviet Union made many important decisions that were 
to influence the happenings in the post war world. Not 
only is the Crimean Conference import ant because of the 
decisions themselves, but the controversy over the 
decisions and the way that they were reached is still 
going on to-day. In America the feelings about the 
Crimean Co:ni'erence run to great extremes. On one hand 
the agreements are branded as a complete betrayal of 
democratic principles, and of American interests and 
are the source of our post war difficulties with the 
Soviet Union. While on the other hand they are defended 
as great diplomatic victories for the Western Allies on 
the grounds that the terms which Stalin accepted were 
so unfavorable to Russia that he couldn't fulfill his 
aggressive designs without violating his solemn pledge.l 
1Chester Wilmot, "Was Yalta a Calamity?n, New York 
Times Magazine, XXXVII (August 3, 1952), 46-48. 
AN EVALUATION OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AT YALTA 
BACKGROUND 
A survey of some background information is needed be-
fore we can discuss the conference itself. The first 
question that arises i s why was it necessary that a con-
ference be held. The Big Three had not held a meeting 
since December, 1943, at Tehran. There were some major 
problems which had arisen, and there was a general feeling 
that these problems could best be handled at the summit 
level. The last great German offensive had been stopped 
on the Western Front, and the Russians were in control of 
Eastern Europe. There was a need to co-ordinate the final 
offensives against Germany. The questi on of what to do 
with Germany had to be settled, and new governments had 
to be established in the newly liberated areas of Central 
Europe. In the Far East the defeat of Japan seemed a 
long way off; however, it was important that the United 
States find out what part the Soviet Union was to play 
in this subsequent defeat. 
A second question is why was Yalta, a city in the 
Soviet Union, chosen as the site for the conference. 
It would appear that such a conference should be held 
3 
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at a neutral loca tion. The choice involved quite a bit 
of hag~ling , and six months passed before a site could be 
agreed upon. President Roosevelt suggested such places 
as Scotland, Cyprus, and Athens; however, Stalin re-
so l utely refused to leave the Soviet Union. The main 
reason which h.e gave was that his doctors had advised 
that his health was not good enough to endure a long trip.2 
To ful l y understand an event it is necessary to look 
at the conditon of the world at the time the event 
occurred. These world conditions will be used at various 
times throughout this paper to help explain why certain 
actions were taken. On the We stern European Front the 
Anglo-American Forces, having lately recovered the territory 
lost in the Bat ~ le of the Bulge, were just entering German 
territory. In Italy the Appenine Mountains made the 
progress very slow, and the Po River was yet to be reached. 
In the Far East the American Navy had defeated the last 
important Japanese Naval Grou~ in the battle of Leyte 
Gulf. However, Luzon had not been ful l y captured, and 
the very bloody battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa were 
still in the future. Nobody really knew how long it 
would take to fully conquer the Japanese. Meanwhile the 
Russians had driven the Germans across Eastern Europe 
2John L. Snell, The Meaning of Yalta (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1956), p. 26-34. 
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and had liberated Rumania, Bulgaria, and parts of Poland 
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and Hungary. 
EVALUATION OF METHOD 
There are some general criticisms of the Yalta Con-
ference that must be dealt with before we can evaluate 
the individual decisions. These comments deal mostly 
with President Roosevelt himself and some of the pro-
cedures he used in conducting United States affairs at 
the conference. There is fe eling that Mr. Roosevelt's 
method of work wasn't systematic. He did not rely 
enough on his subordinates for the information needed to 
make wise decisions. As a result he made mistakes which 
he would not have made had he used all the sources of in-
formation availf~le to him. Also the subordinates were not 
kept up to date on just what type of action he was persuing.4 
Also along this same train of thought were objections 
to the amount of secrecy which was involved in some of 
the transactions between Stalin and Roosevelt. These 
secret deals, plus the fact that no Congressional represent-
atives were present, made it appear that President Roosevelt 
was showing a disregard for Constitutional principles. 
3Allan Nevins, The New Deal in World Affairs (New Haven: 
Yale University Press , 1951), p . 297. 
4Rudolph A. Winnacker, "Yalta-Another Munich?n, The 
Virginia Quarterl y Review, XXIV, (October 1948), 522-'37"° 
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He usurped the powers which should have belonged to 
Congress as personal representatives of the free people 
of America. These critics feel that President Roosevelt 
exceeded the power which had been vested in him as Pres-
ident of the United States.5 
Supporters of Mr. Roosevelt point out that the cir-
cumstances dictated that he assume a great deal of per-
sonal power at the eonferenee. The question of whether 
his methods violated the Constitution is not one that can 
be solved in a concrete manner but can only be discussed 
in the light of how the Constitution should be inter-
preted. President Roosevelt was forced to make many 
quick decisions. These decisions had to be of a personal 
nature, since it would have been impossible for Mr. Roos-
evelt to have accomplished anything if he had checked with 
Congress on e ach issue before he made a decision. This 
type of action would have rendered him powerless and 
would have made such a summit meeting an impossibility.6 
The President's use of secrecy can be justified by the 
nature of the decisions that were to be made, especially 
those involving the entrance of Russia into the Asiatic 
War. 
A second general area of criticism involves relations 
between the United States and Great Britain prior to 
5navid Lawrence, "The Sin of Yalta" U.S. News and World 
Report, XXXVIII, {April 1, 1955), 132. 
6Richard C. Snyder and Edgar S Furniss, Jr, American 
Foreign Policy (New York: Rinehart and Go., Inc, T956), 
p. 457-520. 
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and dur i ng the conference. At the time the conference 
was held Anglo-American rel a tions were at a low ebb. We 
had openly criticized British action in attempting a sphere 
of influence in the Balkans. This could have given Rus s ia 
the idea that we therefore sup~orted their claims in that 
area. Secondly President Roosevelt didn't hold any major 
strategy sessions with Churchill prior to the Yalta 
Conference. This seemed an error since our views on most 
of the vital issues were really v ery similar to those of 
the British. Our position would have been much stronger, 
and we could have presented a united front if we had taken 
the time to meet to-gether to work things out. Third even 
after the conference had started President Roosevelt 
assumed the role of the mediator and s pent much of his time 
settling disputed between Rus s ia and Great Britain when he 
should have been so l idly behind the British. 7 
The problem for Roosevelt supporters is to explain 
the logic behind President Roosevelt's treatment of Great 
Britain. Here is the apparent strategy behind the action. 
President Roosevelt was convinced that Russia was going 
to play a major role in the post-war world. Any organ-
izat ion to maintain world peace, such as the United Nations, 
must contain a co-operative Soviet Union if it was to have 
any chance of working. Therefore, President Roosevelt 
7wilmot, New York Times Magazine, XYJ:VIII, 46. 
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did everything in his power to help Russia feel that we 
were sincerely interested in co-operating with them. 
Knowing the suspicious nature of the Russians, he felt 
that any extensive meeting towork out joint policy with 
the Br·i tish would be looked upon by the Soviet Union as a 
conspiracy. He did not want Stalin to feel he was faced 
with an Anglo-American Coalition. 
Secondly, Roosevlet felt ~hat only in his position 
as mediator could he bring the divergent views of Churchill 
and Stalin closer together. Always siding with the British 
would have cuaused an immediate schism, and none of the 
objectives of the peace could possibly be attained. 
EVALUATION OF TEE MAJOR DECISIONS 
Next we will look at some of the particular decisions 
which were reached at the conference. The four main areas 
to be surveyed are the Polish question, Germany, United 
Nations Organization, and the entry of Russia into the 
Asiatic War. The first item to be covered is the Polish 
Question. At the time the conference was held the Russians had 
liberated most of Poland. They had already set up a 
pro-communist government known as the Lublin Provisional 
Government. Therefore, the two basic questions involved 
the new boundaries of Poland, and the type of government 
it should have. 8 The boundary question was settled in the 
8Ernest K. Lindley, "If There Had Been No Yalta", 
Newsweek, XLV, (March 25,1955), 31. 
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following manner. It was agreed that the Curzon Line, 
with minor digressions of five to eight kilometers in 
favor of Poland, should serve as the eastern boundary. 
This meant that a 69,000 square mile area of pre-war 
Poland would become Soviet territory. To compensate for 
this loss Poland was promised part of East Prussia and 
substantial German territory lying east of a general line 
drawn from Stettin southward to the western border of the 
Silesia :province. The government problem was handled by 
giving recognition to the Moscow sponsored Lublin Provisional 
Government, but it was agreed that the provisional govern-
ment should be reorganized on a broader democratic basis. 
This would be accomplished by including democratic leaders 
from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. 9 
Major criticism of the Polish decisions fall into 
four main categories. The first is that the action of 
Churchill and Roosevelt in agreeing to the boundary changes 
was a direct violation of the Atlantic Charter. In the 
Atlantic Charter a pledge had been made that no new bound-
aries would be imposed without the will of the people in-
volved. Therefore, it was wrong for President Roosevelt to 
agree to the dividing up of a country with no apparent 
concern for the people involved.10 
9Encyclo2edia Americana, (New York: Americana Corp., 
1959), :p. 559z." . m~· -
lOJulius w. Pratt, A History of United States Forei~n 
Policy (Englewood Clifts, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1955, 
p. 688-9. 
10 
Secondly, it was felt that a much firmer stand should 
have been taken concerning the proposed government for 
Poland. At first Roosevelt refused to completely re-
cognize the Russian puppet Lublin Government and demanded 
a fresh government with all parties having an equal 
opportunity through free elections. However, he compromised 
his stand until he accepted the Lublin group as the frame-
work of the new government. Roosevelt's willingness to 
make concessions in the hope of obtaining Russian co-
operation can be seen in the following statement. "I am 
determined that there shall be no break between ourselves 
and the Soviet Union regarding Poland.rr In fact Roosevelt 
was so anxious that he even gave way when Stalin objected 
to a British proposal that the Polish elections should 
be supervised by the British, Americ an, and Soviet 
Ambassadors in Warsaw.11 
The f ate of Poland provided a test case for the whole 
Yalta enterprise. Here, if anywhere, the West could have 
made a do-or-die stand on the simple issue of fair play 
for a gallant ally. But Roosevelt merely pleaded for a 
little sugar coating on the bitter Polish pill, and the 
best argument he could muster was the need to satisfy the 
Polish-American vote to keephis party in power.12 
llwilmot, The New York Times Magzine, XXXVII, 46-7. 
12Eugene Lyons, rtThe Yalta Calmity", American Mercury, 
LXXXI, (July 1955) 96-8. 
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The following points can be presented as justification 
of President Roosevelt's Polish decisions. True, the 
departures from the Atlantic Charter and some minor 
concessions can not be defended if placed by themselves. 
However, by placing them in their proper relation to overall 
world conditions, they become understandable. Russia's 
tremendous military success on the Eastern Front and the 
fact she was presently occupying most of pre-war Polish 
territory put the United States in a very poor bargaining 
position. Therefore, it was not a question of what we 
would permit Russia to do but one of what we could persuade 
them not to do. The selection of the Curzon Line had 
sound ethnological arguments. This line had been drawn 
by an Englishman in 1919, and Churchill already had sup-
ported the Curzon Line in the House of Commons before 
the Yalta Conference. Although Stalin was very set on this 
border, he did make deviations of five to eight kilometers 
to Poland. In regards to government, the Russians had 
set up the Lublin Government and insisted that it only needed 
to be enlarged. However, Roosevelt finally got Stalin to 
agree to the reorganization mentioned above. He also 
obtained from Stalin a promise that free elections would 
be held at the earliest possible date. The trouble was not 
in the agreements reached but in the fact that the Russians 
didn't keep their word. It must be remembered that in any 
12 
conference compromises must be made. So Roosevelt sup-
porters feel, considering the bad military position, the 
fact we got the Russians to make any concessions was quite 
an accomplishment.13 
The second main area of survey will be Germany. The 
future status of Germany was left undecided. After sur-
render it was to be divided into four zones for occupational 
purposes. The Big Three plus France would make up the 
occupying powers. It was decided that reparations were to 
be paid to the nations which had borne the main brunt of 
German agression. There were to be three main types of 
reparations. First was the removal over a two year period 
of capital goods for the chief purpose of destroying the 
war potential of Germany. Second, there would be an annual 
delivery of goods from current production. Third, German 
labor could be used by the country receiving reparations.14 
The majority of the attack on the decisions concerning 
Germany are based on the payment of reparations. It was 
:pointed out that the excessive reparations which had been 
imposed on Germany following World War I were a basis for 
the financial problems which beset the post-war German 
government. These same financial problems caused collapse 
and gave rise to the dictatorial power of Hitler. The same 
13Edwin R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians 
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co. Inc., 1949), p. 300-3. 
14Pratt, 686-7. 
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mistake was being made again. However, the most shocking 
part of the reparation agreement was the use of German 
labor as a part of the payment. Here we were agreeing 
to the same things which we had so violently criticized 
the Germans for doing. It appeared very much against 
the fundmental beliefs of Ame r ica to allow men to be 
sold into slavery. 
The main victory for Roosevelt in this area was the 
securing of Russian approval to give France an occupation 
zone and a seat on the control council. This gave France 
additional prestige, which was badly needed. President 
Roosevelt also fought very hard on the mat t er of reparations 
and was able to keep Stalin from putting the figure of 
twenty bill ion in the agreement.15 
The use of German labor as reparation is difficult 
to justify. However, it is to be remembered that we were 
waging a bloody war with the Germans, and no one was 
disposed to be very tender toward Germany, especially in 
light of some of the sensational examples of German bar-
barianism that were being discovered in some of their 
prison camps. In regard to the treatment of the Germans 
being a violation of the Atlantic Charter, Winston Churchill 
said, "Unconditional Surrender excluded the enemy from any 
15stettinius, 263-6. 
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of the benefits of the Atlantic Charter. 
A third major area of discussion at the Crimean Con-
ference concerned the formation of the United Nations 
Organization. At Yalta two major problems which were hin-
dering the formation of the United Nations were discussed. 
The first dealt with how heavily were the major powers to 
be represented in the General Assembly. Stalin had de-
manded sixteen seats for the Soviet Union. One for each 
of the republics. Roosevelt felt all countries should 
have one vote. A compromise was worked out giving Russia 
three votes. The second question was how thoroughly were 
the great powers to dominate the world organization? To 
safeguard the right of the major powers, the Big Five 
were given veto power in the Security Council. In other 
words , all that would be needed to block U.N. action would 
be a negative vote by one of the Big Five. An amazing 
fact, in light of subsequent happenings, is that both 
the United States and Russia wanted some type of a veto 
power. The question was whether this veto should apply 
to all matters or in the more serious cases. Russia wanted 
unlimited veto power while the United States felt it should 
be restricted. The United States was largely successful 
because the veto power was limited to more important matters 
such as admission and expulsion of members and the use of 
force against an agressor nation.16 
16pratt, 689. 
15 
The right of veto power in the Security Council has 
proven to be the biggest factor in limiting the action of 
the United Nations. Here President Roosevelt not only 
showed disdain for the rights of the small nations of 
the world but also overlooked two important danger signals. 
Stalin gave indication of his future designs in his demand 
for more seats and his insistance on being able to block 
any action taken against Russia. The aim of the United 
Nations was world peace, and a veto power made it impossible 
to take steps against the Big Five, the only nations capable 
of waging war.17 
How then will it be possible to justify the destruction 
of the Organization President Roosevelt so greatly desired? 
Supporters can point to the fact that lifiir. Roosevelt forced 
Stalin to compromise in both major areas. Although they 
are not apparent to-day, there are some basic reasons why 
Roosevelt desired the veto :power. First, a survey of history 
shows that the United States did not join the League of 
Nations because of the fear that we would be drawn into 
all manner of foreign disputes without our wishing it. 
The veto power would give Congress and the people of the 
United States the assurance that we would not be the help-
less pawns of a world organization over which we had no 
control. Haa_ President Roosevelt taken a stand against 
the veto, it is a foregone conclusion that Russia would 
17"The Yalta Story", Time, LXV (March 28, 1955), 27-32 . 
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have taken no part in any United Na t ion's activities. 
Therefore, since a major goal of Roosevelt was to get 
Russia in the United Nations, he would have been forced 
to go along with the veto or see his goal vanish. In 
accepting the veto Roosevelt was going along with the 
wishes of the majority of A.mericans.18 
A fourth topic for examination is the entrance of the 
Russi ans into the Asiatic War and the concessions which 
were given to the Russians for their participation. How-
ever, before discussing the advisability of the concessions, 
it is important to discover if Russian help was reall y 
needed to defe at the Japanese. 
Opponents of Roo sevelt's policies would have you be-
lieve that by February, 1945, we were well on our way to 
victory in the Pacific. There is no good reason why Pres-
ident Roosevelt didn't know this. Much of this comment 
i s based on the fact that the United States now had a very 
powerful weapon known as the atomic bomb. On December . 30, 
1944, Major General Leslie Groves, Chief of the Manhattan 
District Project, sent a to p secret report to the Chief 
of Staff, General Marshall. A copy also went to the Pres-
ident who approved it. It was labeled. nAtomic Fis sion 
Bombs". It read as follows: 
rrrt is now reasonable certain that our opera-
tions plans should be based on the gun type bomb 
18stettinius, 295-9. 
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which it is estimated will produce the equivilent 
of a ten-thousand ton TNT explosion. The first 
bomb, without previous full scale tests which 
we do not believe wil l be necessary, should 
be ready about 1 August 1945.nl9 
It appears that top United States leaders knew that we 
should soon have in our possession a bomb capable of des-
troying a whole city. 
Not only were we soon to have a bomb, but the air 
and sea power of Japan had been greatly reduced. Therefore, 
it was already a known fact that we were going to win the 
war in the Pacific, it was just a matter of time. 
Getting the Russians into the Asiatic was was one of 
the main goals th .::!. t Roosevelt had at the Yalta Conference. 
The Pr·esident was the victim of a report which had been 
submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This report had 
stated that the end of the Japanese surrender would be 
the lat ter part of 1946. To achieve this surrender, it 
would be necessary to invade the highly fortified home 
islands of Japan. These operations could cause the United 
States one million casualties. Also the Japanese had a 
strong force on the Asiatic mainland. It had been hoped 
that the Chinese would be strong enough to keep them en-
gaged, but the Chinese were sapped by long warfare. 
Therefore, a Russian invasion of Manchuria was needed. 
A long drawn out war would have a demoralizing effect on 
the already war-weary American soldiers ; therefore 
19 11Things Yalta Papers Reveal" , U.S. News and World 
Report, XXXVIII, (March 25, 1955), 42-5. 
18 
Roosevelt felt justified in calling for Russian aid in an 
efff ort to shorten the war . The real value of the atomic 
bomb was questionable as there had been no actual tests 
to determine what effect it would have on the enemy.20 
There were people who felt we needed Rus s ian help 
in the Pacific but objected to the concessions g~ven to 
obtain this aid . In agreeing to enter the Asiatic War 
three months after the war in Eurpoe was terminated the 
Russians received the following things: (l) The Kurile 
Islands and southern Sakhalin were ceded to the Soviet 
Union; (2) The status quo in Outer Mongolia was preserved; 
(3.) The .commercial port of Darien was internationalized, 
with the understanding that the preeminant interests of 
the Soviet Union were safeguarded, and lease of Port Arthur 
as a naval base of the Soviet Unj_on was restored; (4) 
The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and South Manchurian Rail-
road which provides an outlet for Darien was jointly 
operated by the Chinese and Russians, it being understood 
that the preeminant interests of the Soviet Union were 
safeguarded, and that China was to retain full sovereignty 
in Ma...nchuria . 21 
Critics of these concessions point out that even if 
we felt we needed Russian help, we didn't need to give them 
L •--· ·----··- · ·~-·- q • • ~ '-. 0 < • L 0 ' . L . L • - - ·-------
20stettinius, 301-7. 
21s i 150 ne 1, • 
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anything. How else could Russia extend its sphere of in-
fluence in the Pacific without joining in on the defeat of 
Japan? Therefore , why give away anything that was destined 
to be free. Mr . Anthony Eden, Foreign Minister of Great 
Britain had this to say about Russian participation in the 
Pacific War . 11 If Russia decided to enter the war it was 
because they considered it not in their best interests 
that the Japanese War should be successfully finished by 
the United States and Britain alone. 11 22 
Charges are also made that we sold out our ally China 
by making these concessions without prior consultation 
with Chiang Kai-Shek. Obviously by giving the Russians 
the preeminant interest in the Manchurian Railroad and 
the cities of Port Arthur and Darien, it would be next 
to impossible for China to keep their promised sovereignty 
in Manchuria. Russia not China would have the main control. 
This give away of Chinese rights was a direct violation of 
our century long stand for the territorial integrity of 
the Chinese Nation.23 
Why then was Roosevelt willing to make these concessions? 
First it must be remembered that the securing of Russian aid 
in the Pacific was one of the major objectives of Roose-
velt. He considered that the gain from the military 
intervention was much greater than the concessions he had 
22Time LXV, 42-5 . _, 
23John C. Campbell, The United States in World Affairs 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947) p. 68. 
20 
made. Also the conces s ions are justified by the following 
statement: nwhat was given to Russia that Russia eould 
not have very easily taken themselves.n Take the :fol-
lowing case. The Russians cou1d very easily watched 
while the United States and Japan continued to wage war; 
and when both were engaged in a bitter struggle over the 
home islands, then Russia could occupy Manchuria, Northern 
China, Korea, and anything else they wanted . These agree-
ments at Yalta set a limit on what they could legally 
occupy and contro1.24 
24Lindley, Newsweek, XLV, 31. 
CONCLUSION 
I would like to look at Yalta as one grand effort 
to produce a world in which all nations could live in 
peace. President Roosevelt knew that this peace could 
only be attained through the work of the United Nations. 
The only way the United Nations could function succes s -
fully was to have the Soviet Union as a full-fledged 
co-ope rating member. To accomplish this, President 
Roosevelt knew he had to alter the suspicious nature of 
the Russians . They had to be convinced that the United 
States and Great Britain were interested in dealing with 
them in an atmosphere of mutual trust. . It was this 
knowledge and the great fe ar of what would happen if the 
Soviet Union and the United States became enemies that 
lead him to make the compromises which today look appeasing. 
Despite the lofty aspirations of Roosevelt it would 
appear that he was guilty of an oversight. He did not take 
into consideration the implica tions of Communism. 
President Roosevelt thought he was dealing with Stalin the 
ruler of our ally the Soviet Union, when in reality he 
was dealing with Stalinthe leader of a Communist idealogy 
which has as its goal the destruction of all capitalist 
nations. 
~l 
22 
It has now been fifteen ye ars since Yalta. Agree-
ments made have been broken. The vision of a world living 
in peace has been shattered. However, I do not fell the 
effort was made in vain. Only the future history of the 
world can give us the full answer. 
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